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Market Competition and Auditor 
Independence 
Keith Houghton and Christine Jubb  
n the past two years, Australia and other jurisdictions have again witnessed a 
series of unsignalled corporate collapses.  As with previous generations of 
corporate collapse several have been associated with questionable accounting 
policies and concerns with auditing quality.  With the decomposition of the former 
global auditing firm once known as Arthur Andersen, the implications for the 
accounting profession are seen as more serious than ever before.   
Over many decades corporate community and regulators in Australia and 
other jurisdictions have implemented change after high profile company failures 
occur.  Some of the implemented changes have, over time, enhanced the quality of 
auditing but we continue to see unsignalled corporate failures, prompting an 
ongoing perception that the audit process is not delivering a product of value to 
the market.  This perception has been described as an ‘expectations gap’, which 
arises in part because what is expected by market participants is not realistic.  
However, of serious concern for the auditing profession is the fact that there 
remain instances where people with clear understanding of audit processes and 
realistic expectations of audit outcomes raise concerns about audit quality. 
This paper argues for the creation of a market-observable audit independence 
quality control process, developed under the scrutiny of market competition.  Such 
an independence quality control process needs to infiltrate the culture of the audit 
firm and, critically, to underpin the culture and ethos of the audit processes.  Two 
alternative versions of the model are proposed.  One of these involves 
commissioning regular expert reviews focussed on independence.  The second 
involves each firm that has publicly traded audit engagements establishing an 
Independence Control Board, composed of respected and knowledgeable 
individuals not in a position to benefit from the Board’s decisions.   
The model proposed to quality-control independence represents a ‘market-
based’ solution to the challenges currently facing the auditing profession in that 
they rely on audit suppliers to have processes visible to the market and to respond 
to market pressure.  The paper argues that a market-based solution is likely to 
engender efficiencies and transparent quality enhancements that a regulated 
solution of the type proposed by the Ramsay (2001) Report, the Proposals for 
Reform Paper No. 9 (CLERP 9) of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(2002), and the HIH Royal Commission (2003) will struggle to deliver because of 
the subtlety and contingent nature of threats to independence.   
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The next section examines theories of the demand for auditing.  Successive 
sections then explain the difficulty in evaluating the quality of audit; canvass 
regulatory proposals to enhance auditor independence; explain some of the 
workings of the proposed independence quality control processes; analyse why 
regulating independence will struggle to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and 
completeness; discuss the effect of independence quality control processes on the 
audit; and discuss the role of regulators and legislation in successfully 
implementing the proposed models.  The final section summarises our 
recommendations, provides concluding remarks and discusses potential criticisms 
of the recommendations. 
The Demand for Audit 
The demand for audit services is, in many instances, compulsory due to legislative 
or other regulatory requirement, although there is evidence that without this 
compulsion auditing would nevertheless be demanded (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983).  Theories explaining this demand centre on moral hazard and the need to 
monitor management as principal in a principal-agent relationship (Wallace, 
1987), the desire on the part of shareholders to spread their risk by virtue of the 
auditor’s access to indemnity insurance (Menon and Williams, 1994), and the need 
of the capital market for credible information in order to assess future cash flows 
and strike an appropriate security price (Wallace, 1987). 
The Value Adding Capacities of Audit 
Financial reports of a company are originated by and are the representations of the 
management and directors of that company.  An audit attests to these 
representations and in Australia assesses the truth and fairness of those financial 
reports.  Many parallel truth and fairness to validity and reliability.  This 
highlights two factors:  (i) that financial reports are indeed the representations of 
management and are not primarily originated by the auditor, and (ii) that it is the 
auditor’s responsibility to attest to the validity and reliability of those reports.   
Regardless of the motivation behind the demand for auditing, its value rests 
on two crucial requirements.  First, the attestation needs to be competent.  It needs 
to be undertaken by those with appropriate expertise (which may extend to 
industry specific, asset/liability or transaction expertise) (Craswell, Francis and 
Taylor, 1995) and may involve the necessity of having competent audit structures, 
technologies and processes to undertake the audit.  Second, it must be undertaken 
independent of management.  The judgement exercised by the auditor needs to test 
the assertions made by management and not simply concur with them.  Even the 
insurance hypothesis, which implies that litigation against an auditor will ensue 
given a situation of investor loss, logically concludes that as a minimum for a 
successful defence the audit must be both competent and independent. 
Financial information that is perceived to be more valid and reliable means it 
has lower risk, which results in a higher stock price than in the absence of audit.  
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Credible audits should, therefore, add value to a company and have the potential to 
affect stock price.  By the same logic, higher stock prices should result when a 
higher quality of audit is delivered, or perceived to be delivered.  Similarly, those 
that trade in debt will attach a different risk premium between companies that are 
audited and unaudited and those that are audited by a perceived high quality 
auditor and those that are not.   
Thus, despite the high level of regulation in many jurisdictions, the audit 
product is not homogenous in quality.  We observe differences and if one 
examines both the literature and the websites of many accounting firms, one will 
see them competing strongly on the basis of quality differences in respect of audit 
competency.  Many accounting firms claim industry specific expertise or other 
types of competency that quality differentiate them from other suppliers, although 
there is little evidence that firms quality-differentiate in respect of independence.  
In at least some cases, the client’s requirement for industry specific expertise in 
supplying of both audit and non-audit services reduces the number of viable 
potential suppliers and compounds the potential for compromised independence, 
or at least appearances of this, when both services are concurrently supplied. 
Two Pillars of Auditing:  Competence and Independence 
As argued above, the existence of both competency and independence are 
necessary conditions for the audit to be a value-adding good; one cannot be a 
substitute for the other.  Core competencies in auditing have been analysed and 
documented at the commissioning of the professional bodies (Birkett, 1989 and 
1992).  However, despite the recently updated Professional Statement F1, an 
accepted definition of auditor and audit firm independence remains elusive.  The 
HIH Royal Commission (April, 2003) recommends that all standards of 
independence of auditors in Australia, including those contained in legislation and 
professional standards such as Professional Statement F1, be consistent with a 
standard of independence defined as follows (Recommendation 9): 
An auditor is not independent with respect to an audit client if the 
auditor might be impaired—or a reasonable person with full knowledge 
of all relevant facts and circumstances might apprehend that the auditor 
might be impaired—in the auditor’s exercise of objective and impartial 
judgment on all matters arising out of auditor’s engagement.  A 
reference to an auditor includes both an individual auditor and an audit 
firm.  In determining whether an auditor or an audit firm is independent, 
all relevant circumstances should be considered, including all pre-
existing relationships between auditor, the audit firm and audit client, 
including its management and directors.   
However, neither actual audit competency nor actual audit independence are 
easily discernible as the next section explains. 
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Audit as an ‘Experience Good’ 
Unlike many commodities, an audit is not a ‘good’ that can be observed ex ante 
and so is an ‘experience good’ about which observable evidence is gained after it 
is actually experienced (Craswell and Francis, 1999).  This makes auditor choice 
and the decision about the acceptable price of the audit more difficult than in 
many other markets.  Even after it has been experienced, it is not easy to observe 
all the qualities of an audit and only those most intimately involved with the 
auditor may be able to observe key quality-related characteristics.  This makes it 
very difficult for the shareholder — on whose behalf the audit function operates 
— to discern quality and makes the role of company insiders in putting forward an 
auditor for shareholder vote of increased importance. 
Those intimately involved with the audit will have some limited opportunities 
to observe aspects of competence.  However, there are only rare instances where 
such people are aware of auditor independence threats and can observe how the 
auditor deals with them.  Therefore, relative to competency levels, quality of 
independence is difficult to observe even in the most intimate of circumstances.  
There is a presumption by auditees and those interested in the audit process that 
independence exists, but its existence is taken on trust rather than having any 
substantive underlying evidence for belief in it.  If this trust is eroded in any way, 
the outcome is likely to involve scepticism and the depleted value attributed to 
audit will be more exaggerated than would otherwise be the case.  Restoring trust 
in the current environment hence presents a major challenge for the profession. 
An important issue is that while many professional services are ‘experience 
goods’, the provision of auditing services is unusual.  Generally the provision of 
professional services (medical services, legal representation and the like) involves 
direct and full client/provider communication.  There is little communication 
between an auditor and his or her client.  More recently there is a fuller 
communication between the clients’ representatives (the board of directors’ audit 
committees where they exist) and the auditor.  But even then it is only now that 
there is active debate which suggests that best practice exists where the auditee 
(company management) not be present when that communication between auditor 
and client representative takes place, Further, there has been no suggestion that 
then there is communication between the auditee management and auditor that the 
audit committee be present! The absence of a well functioning communication 
process makes the issues around the ‘experience good’ even more acute for 
auditing. 
Competing on Competency 
As can be observed in the brochures of many accounting firms, from their 
websites and particularly in their tender documents, audit firms compete 
vigorously in respect of competency.  We observe that certain firms have 
specifically expert partners or that they have enhanced experience and competency 
in respect of a particular industry class or classes.  They also compete on different 
types of audit technology, different databases of industry or general economic 
Market Competition and Auditor Independence 217
information, particular information system flows, or research capability.  This 
competition has led undoubtedly to the development of greater expertise and 
added to higher audit quality.  There is also no doubt that audit technologies have 
evolved and become better focused on higher risk issues within auditees.  These 
are the benefits of a competitive process within the market for audit services.   
Competing on Independence 
Although audit firms disclose information about firm-wide competency, there is 
little or no observable information on the processes and outcomes in respect of 
independence.  Auditors are exposed to potential threats to independence many 
times during and even before acceptance of audit engagements.  These threats to 
independence find their way into an audit process in various ways.  Examples of 
threats to independence include:  the joint provision of audit and auditor-provided 
non-audit services (APNAS), the hiring of former audit staff by an auditee (or vice 
versa), the appointment of former audit firm personnel to the board of directors of 
an auditee or its audit committee, the employment of close relatives of audit 
partners or staff by an auditee, threats issued by an auditee to terminate an audit 
engagement or put out for tender an auditor engagement if an auditor does not 
withdraw a threatened qualification and/or comply with a particularly assertive or 
controversial accounting policy choice.  Several of these examples do not 
necessarily prima facie pose a threat to independence but they have the potential 
to become a threat in certain circumstances.  Put another way, a threat to 
independence can be a conditional relationship.   
A further difficulty is that these potential threats are frequently not easily 
measurable.  A threat to independence can be extremely subtle and it is possible 
that auditors themselves are not even conscious of it.  Indeed, it is also possible 
that auditees are not conscious of it.  Possibilities of these subtle threats include 
situations where fee dependence by an audit firm may be not just from one 
auditee, but from a ‘family’ of auditees all linked by shared directors.  The 
presence here of a degree of subtlety cannot be over-emphasised.  It can also mean 
that possible threats may not eventuate.   
Testing Auditor Competence and Independence 
The great majority of auditors are intelligent, diligent and professional people who 
seek to produce a competent independent audit.  In the vast majority of cases it is 
our belief that competent independent audits are produced, however, it is difficult 
or even impossible to verify this because it is rare for the independence (and 
competence) of an audit to be rigorously tested.  A comprehensive examination of 
the qualities of an audit only occurs in a public arena when an auditee suffers 
severe financial distress.  However, even in some of these circumstances these 
allegations are not followed through, perhaps because of the significant costs of 
litigation or perhaps because there is some earlier compromise or settlement.  In 
some cases there is significant follow-through and on a non-trivial number of 
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occasions in recent years audit failure or at least perceived audit failure has 
occurred in a number of jurisdictions.   
There are generally two areas in which allegations are made, again relating to 
the two classic pillars of auditing:  competence and independence.  With regard to 
defence strategies relating to competence, it is common for auditors to obtain the 
services of another auditor to review the working papers and other documentation 
relating to an audit and reach a judgement as to whether the audit processes have 
been reasonable and competently executed.  While it is not uncommon for this 
audit review to also attempt to cover any issues of independence, it is rare in our 
experience for evidence to be brought forward that can assist in any defence 
against accusations of a lack of independence.  Indeed, while various forms of 
evidence that demonstrate the competence of an auditor can be indicated, there is 
often little that can be identified to assert that judgements and decisions reached 
were made independent of auditee management.   
Usually, judgements in respect of independence are entirely in-house.  
Perhaps more disturbing is that:  (i) recognition of threats to independence; (ii) 
determination of alternative courses of action; and (iii) final judgement relating to 
decisions involving independence, are routinely made by those persons within the 
audit firm who (directly or indirectly) have some commercial interest in the 
outcome of the decision.  Auditors have mechanisms and processes to defend 
accusations of lack of competence.  However, they appear to have few, if any, 
effective defences in respect of accusations of lack of independence.   
Legislating or Regulating for Auditor Competence and Independence 
Some jurisdictions have chosen to react to the latest generation of unsignalled 
corporate collapses by taking the high regulation route, others have at the time of 
writing simply proposed such a solution (for example Ramsay, 2001; Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 2002; CLERP 9, 2002; HIH Royal 
Commission, 2003).  In Australia, CLERP 9 proposes to take up many of the 
recommendations in the Government commissioned Ramsay Report (2001).  The 
HIH Royal Commission (2003) recommends extending the CLERP 9 proposals in 
several instances.  For instance, in relation to auditor independence and 
competence, CLERP 9 recommends expanding the responsibilities of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), currently responsible for oversight of the 
AASB (Australian Accounting Standards Board), to include auditor independence 
(Proposal 1), and amending the Corporations Act to: 
 
• include a General Statement of Principle requiring the independence of 
auditors (Proposal 2); 
• require the auditor to make an annual declaration, addressed to the board of 
directors, that the auditor has maintained its independence in accordance with 
the Act and rules of the professional accounting bodies (Proposal 3); 
• strengthen restrictions on employment relationships between an auditor and 
audit client (Proposal 4).  This will include a mandatory period of two years 
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following resignation from an audit firm before a former partner who was 
directly involved in the audit of a client can become a director of the client or 
take a position with a client involving responsibility for fundamental 
management decisions.  The HIH Royal Commission (Recommendation 11) 
recommends the period be four years and the requirement extend to key 
senior audit personnel.  It also recommends the provision be enforceable 
against both the audit firm and the relevant former partner or senior audit 
team member.  For a former partner who was not directly involved in audit of 
client the period of restriction should be 2 years.  Additionally it recommends 
a prohibition on any more than one former partner of audit firm, at any time, 
being a director of or taking a senior management position with a client; 
• impose new restrictions on financial relationships (Proposal 5) covering 
investments in audit clients and loans between an audit client, and the auditor 
or his immediate family; 
• require mandatory disclosure in the annual report of fees paid for the 
categories of APNAS provided (Proposal 7); 
• require a statement in the annual report of whether the audit committee is 
satisfied that the provision of APNAS is compatible with auditor 
independence (Proposal 7).  The HIH Royal Commission (Recommendation 
10) recommends the board of directors provide a statement in the annual 
report that identifies all APNAS and fees applicable to each item of work and 
explains why those non-audit services do not compromise audit 
independence; 
• make audit ‘lead engagement partner’ and ‘review partner’ rotation 
compulsory after five years (Proposal 9).  The HIH Royal Commission 
(Recommendation 12) extends this to key senior audit personnel; and 
• require accountants seeking registration as company auditors to meet agreed 
competency standards, to undertake to abide by an accepted code of 
professional ethics, and to complete a specialist auditing course prior to 
registration (Proposal 11). 
 
With regard to competency, there is merit in ensuring that there is a floor or 
base below which no individual may practise as company auditor.  Generally, this 
is the model used in much of the developed world.   
However, there is no legislation or regulation that precludes competency 
quality differences above this minimum.   
Regulating Independence:  Effectiveness — Timeliness  
If there is to be regulation or legislation in respect of matters of independence or 
threats to independence, we predict that there will be significant costs and 
problems with inefficiencies.  Such regulation will inevitably lead to issues with 
the effective management of the independence requirements for reasons set out 
below.  Ideally, independence requires contemporary decision-making that is ex 
ante rather than ex post.  A regulatory body set up to review auditor independence 
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will inevitably examine only independence issues which have been revealed and 
which are mostly extreme or easily measured.  Independence threats typically 
involve instances of subtle threats, which are not easily measured and therefore 
not susceptible to an effective legalistic or regulatory intervention. 
If there is some outside board or tribunal that deals with independence 
threats, such a board would learn of threats only after the fact and then only where 
there has been a damaging outcome and the facts of the case are publicly, or at 
least semi-publicly, revealed.  This would not aid the efficiency of the market nor 
build value for either auditee or auditor.  It also does not enhance the value to 
stockholders and those that hold the debt of a particular auditee. 
Regulating Independence:  Effectiveness — Defining the Threat 
As noted above, many independence threats are hard to identify and observe in 
practice.  Consider for example of joint supply of audit and APNAS:  under what 
conditions does the joint supply become an independence threat?  If the joint 
supply of some tax compliance actually provides a quick value-adding solution of 
the auditee company is it a threat to independence?  Perhaps, but perhaps not.  To 
operate optimally, the need to define a threat might become case-specific.  If by 
regulation or law a threat to independence is defined as existing where APNAS 
fees are, say, 50 percent of audit fees, then it is possible, even likely, one will 
observe many cases where joint supply will occur at levels of 49.9 percent.  Such a 
situation will be legal but is it not a threat to independence?  The regulation of 
independence may result in cases where the law of independence is substituted for 
the fact of independence — the economy and the stockholder are little or no better 
off than the current situation in which no restriction is imposed externally. 
Regulating Independence:  Efficiency 
As previously noted, independence is subtle, difficult to observe and often hard to 
measure.  Thus, it can be difficult to efficiently regulate the presence of 
independence.  Even if it can be effectively regulated, deciding on the threat, its 
measurement can cause economic inefficiencies.   
Regulating Independence:  Completeness 
Even if threats to independence can be identified, defined and measured in such a 
way that they can be subjected to legal or regulatory intervention, threats to 
independence change and new threats emerge.  Although exceptions existed, a 
decade ago the level of APNAS in relation to that of audit was not an 
independence threat, but it is now.  If legislation in respect of auditor 
independence had been put in place at that time, the joint supply threat would most 
likely have not been identified as an independence threat.  Thus that legislation 
would now be seen as incomplete. 
Also, as many threats are not identified or easily measured, the likelihood of 
legislation being comprehensive is low.   
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Moreover if auditor independence is enforced via a legal or regulated means, 
it is possible, even likely, that various stakeholder groups might erroneously 
conclude that the ‘problem’ is fixed when it is not.  The evidence of the absence of 
a complete ‘solution’ would not be seen until the inevitable next round of 
corporate failures. 
A Market Response to Controlling Auditor Independence 
The high regulation response is not the only option.  As suggested above, suppliers 
of audit services are reactive and proactive in supplying high competency level 
services, including industry specific audit services.  Market responses tend to 
include means by which suppliers and buyers in the market use competitive 
processes to drive up quality and or efficiency.  There are at least two closely 
related means by which this might be achieved. 
The Development of an Independence Control Board 
In advanced economies one observes boards of directors that have policy control 
of auditees.  Conventionally these boards comprise both ‘internal’ directors and 
‘external’ or independent directors.  Capital market theory shows that companies 
with strong corporate governance and independent boards attract a higher share 
price.  The market for information (including the capital market) rewards 
organisations that have good quality control processes that are independent of the 
internal management.   
One way to proceed is that each of the larger audit firms (that is, those that 
have sufficient critical mass in auditing within any particular jurisdiction) 
establish an auditor Independence Control Board (ICB) within the partnership, 
possibly reporting to the Chairperson of the partnership.  Such a Board should 
consist of persons not drawn from current (or ideally former) partners nor other 
employees of the organisation or similar organisations.  They should be experts in 
one or other of several fields (auditing, commercial law, professional services, 
accounting or auditing standard setting and accounting policy making).  This 
Board would for every audit consider each threat to independence that exists 
within the organisation in a contemporaneous and confidential fashion.  The 
outcome of its deliberations would be a decision either to proceed or not with an 
audit engagement and if proceeding, to put in place certain controls and 
procedures that would ensure an adequate level of independence is attained. 
It would be important that these ICBs be chaired by a person who is both 
expert in the area of auditing and independent of the day-to-day operations of the 
organisation.  It is also important that each member of the Board not benefit 
commercially, either directly or indirectly, from any single decision made in 
respect of independence.  This implies that independence decisions should be 
removed from the partners.  The Board would have, in effect, power of veto over 
independence issues and ultimate control of acceptance and retention of audit 
engagements.   
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The reasons why an ICB with internal access to an audit firm would be more 
effective than an arrangement imposed externally are as follows:   
 
1. Independence issues, threats and potential threats can be dealt with swiftly 
and contemporaneously with the audit.  A decision ex ante in any critical 
matter can be made and enforced by the Board. 
2. The Board can deal with commercially sensitive issues without those issues 
becoming public or accessible by competitors. 
3. The quality control processes of the board can be disclosed and observed by 
the market, including by existing shareholders, which gives rise to the 
possibility that shareholders can better evaluate audit quality in making their 
resource allocation decisions than is currently the case and that accounting 
firms would compete on the basis of having good quality control procedures 
for independence, not only for competence or price. 
4. Extremely subtle or difficult to access and measure issues can be dealt with 
sympathetically yet conclusively, and matters where there are conflicting 
arguments can be dealt with without reference to crude measures. 
5. Reward structures within audit firms can take account of decisions made by 
the Board in achieving equity across partners responsible for practice growth. 
 
Hence effectiveness, efficiency and completeness are addressed in a way that 
a regulatory solution cannot provide.   
The existence of such a Board can (and should in the minds of many) be 
supported, protected and monitored by the appropriate corporate regulatory 
agency.  With the CLERP 9 proposals to move responsibility for oversight of audit 
independence to the FRC, this body would appear appropriate to carry out this 
task.  However, given its existing responsibility for oversight of accounting 
standard setting, it will be important the requisite audit related expertise resides in 
its membership and that it receives appropriate resources. 
It is suggested that the professional accounting bodies could sponsor the 
establishment of a Board or Boards, which smaller auditing firms could utilise to 
act as internal ICBs.  The facts of any case would remain entirely confidential and 
the Boards would act swiftly and contemporaneously to deal with any potential 
threat to independence.  It is important there is no suggestion of a substantial 
commercial cost being incurred by declaring a threat to independence and that in 
fact there is a positive outcome from it.  There is, however, an issue that such 
Boards may be inundated by requests to adjudicate.  Remembering that these 
Boards (created by the professional bodies) are unlikely to have a detailed 
knowledge of the firms they are dealing with, their knowledge of the people, 
structures and control procedures will also be more limited.   
In May 2002, the Australian firm of PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 
announced an application of the general model described above.  The PWC 
application follows closely the above model and is the first such application of this 
process that gives audit firms a mechanism by which to be more transparent to the 
market.  At the time of writing, little or no information on the operations of the 
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Board has been made public.  This is unfortunate given a principal feature of the 
original model is to make transparent the effect of the Board. 
The Development of an Expert Review on Independence 
A second method of gaining market transparency by incorporating a quality 
control device can be achieved by the establishment of an Expert Panel (EP) to 
review both the processes and outcomes of independence decisions.  Unlike the 
ICB process, the objective of an EP is not to make decisions ex ante, but to 
examine the quality control processes existing within the firm to see that 
appropriate checks and balances on the quality of independence decisions are in 
place.   
A point of differentiation between the EP Model and the ICB Model is that 
the EP Model would review the processes within the firm rather than actually take 
decisions ex ante.  In effect, it becomes an oversight of the processes within the 
firm and outcomes, to the extent they can be observed, rather than actually taking 
the decisions that relate to independence.  One advantage of the EP Model is that 
it may seek a positive review of existing processes and can survey or sample those 
processes and outcomes that might emanate.  There is thus less opportunity to hide 
ongoing independence disputes after the fact than if they were dealt with ex ante.  
Another difference between the two is that the EP Model would have a clear 
timetable and set of objectives with clearly defined outcomes and publicly 
available conclusions within specified time periods.   
The EP Model relies heavily on two things:   
 
1. The availability of people truly expert in the field of auditing who would also 
have or could develop methodologies for conducting such an enquiry.   
2. Terms of reference giving expert reviewers clear authority to undertake the 
review with ability to access information, assimilate it, test it and then 
distribute results to appropriate stakeholders. 
 
In the second half of 2002 the Australian practice of KPMG announced an 
Expert Review Panel.  The KPMG application was, however, not only in respect 
of independence but also of conflict resolution and of a number of quality control 
processes.  It was, by any measure, far-reaching and included evidence gathering 
of a number of different types but was not comprehensive.  It did not test the audit 
methodology used by that firm worldwide and did not examine specific cases or 
clients, including audit outcomes from these.  The absence of these is consistent 
with the profession’s own internal quality reviews.  Putting aside the practical 
difficulties of including these additional aspects, incorporating some or all of these 
in the terms of reference of a review would be beneficial.   
The publication of the Report of the review came approximately three months 
after it was commissioned.  The first named author was advised that in the first ten 
days after the KPMG Expert Panel Review’s publication on KPMG’s website, the 
Report was down-loaded from unique IP addresses over one and a half thousand 
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times — evidence of market interest in such a transparent process and for 
providing information to the market about quality control processes, particularly 
those that relate to independence.   
An additional advantage of the EP Model is that the review of the firm and its 
processes can detect the extent and culture of the organisation in its care, and 
sensitivity over the threats to independence, in a generalised way.  Major 
disadvantages are that such reviews would not deal with independence ex ante and 
would not specifically deal with particular cases unless it was so agreed in the 
terms of reference. 
Effect of Independence Quality Control Processes 
The creation of a market-observable audit independence quality control process is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the effective quality control of 
independence in an audit process.  The independence quality control process needs 
to influence all the processes in the audit firm and to affect the culture of the audit 
processes.  The culture needs to be affected by the independence quality control 
process and ensure that threats are identified, considered and dealt with.  Perhaps 
more effectively, potential threats need to be recognised ex ante and, where 
possible, avoided.   
In recent times some accounting firms have employed incentive structures 
which resulted in those involved in the audit (either partners or employees) 
benefiting from referrals from an audit client also purchasing consulting activities.  
On occasion this consulting work was undertaken within a separate division of the 
accounting firm and in some cases it may have been undertaken within the audit 
division.  Irrespective of where the work is performed, the use of an audit 
engagement to generate fee revenue for non-audit work, particularly if audit 
personnel remuneration is influenced by this work, immediately gives rise to a 
potential threat to the independence of the audit process.  The issue of including 
fees for non-audit work in the basis for remuneration of partners is something of 
which the HIH Royal Commission (2003) was highly critical.  This is a situation 
not adequately recognised as a threat in the current (recently revised) Professional 
Statement F1 of Australia’s major accounting bodies. 
Use of the audit process to lever additional revenue is seen by some as a 
potentially questionable practice and throws open substantial questions with 
regard to the integrity and independence of the audit.  There is a fine line, 
however, between using the audit process to generate revenue and identifying 
issues that the client may then choose to deal with by outsourcing consultancy.  At 
the very least independence quality control processes set up within firms need to 
review the incentive structures within each of the firms. 
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The Roles of the Stakeholders 
The Role of Regulators and Legislatures 
While the basis of the model is that auditor independence is essentially an 
economic problem, it is clear from current evidence in other world-wide 
jurisdictions that the existing co-regulation approach has resulted in less than 
optimal outcomes, with significant negative economic and social effects.  While 
our proposals rely on competitive market processes, it is crucial that an 
appropriate strong legislative and regulatory framework exist.  Without this 
framework it is possible that audit firms might revert to current behaviour.  The 
essential framework requires the existence of compulsion for auditors of listed 
(publicly traded) corporations (and others where there is a strong public-good 
issue, such as deposit taking institutions) to access a competitive auditor 
independence quality review process.  So a further qualification for undertaking 
company audits is the ability to access a regulator-recognized independence 
quality control process.  This compulsion is a parallel to the requirement for larger 
publicly traded corporations in many jurisdictions to have boards of directors that 
have at least a majority of independent directors, a more direct parallel being the 
requirement of such companies to establish an audit committee of the board of 
directors. 
The second regulatory or legislative requirement comes in the form of 
approval for and/or registration of the quality control processes.  Ideally such 
processes could be registered with a corporate regulator and should possess certain 
minimum standards in respect of membership, procedures and authority.  Ensuring 
that the decisions of the quality control processes are enforceable and enforced is 
part of this framework.  It may be that the FRC play this regulator role in addition 
to its other proposed CLERP 9 duties.  This would result in less reliance on the 
existing and relatively unobtrusive quality control processes run by the two major 
professional bodies.  Having a process such that the decisions are reported to the 
market in a way that does not compromise client confidentiality but informs the 
market that the quality control processes actually ‘bites’ seems an important 
characteristic of the process. 
The Role of the Audit Firms 
Each of the large audit firms would establish a market responsive quality control 
process.  The guidelines, under which these processes are established, the 
credentials of the members involved, the mechanism by which determinations are 
arrived at, and the means by which an appropriate culture is created within the 
firm, are all necessary components of the proposed model.  Firms need to be 
competitive in respect of the independence control processes, and not just 
competitive in respect of competence and price. 
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The Company Auditees 
The proposed model does not call for auditees to establish their own quality 
control procedures in respect of the independence of their auditor.  However it is 
inevitable with new disclosures and new information available to auditees that 
some audit-related decisions will need to be considered with greater rigour and 
frequency than is currently the case.  Inevitably the work of the audit committee 
will become more burdensome and auditees need to acknowledge this change.  
Perhaps the most specific recommendation regarding auditees is that the workload 
of audit committees now include an ongoing assessment of the independence of 
the auditor.  CLERP 9 proposes to require this assessment explicitly where a 
committee exists, and in its absence the task becomes that of the board of 
directors.  Additionally, especially if suggestions such as those presented here are 
not universally accepted, audit committees should evaluate as far as possible the 
procedures in place within the audit firm to make independence related decisions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The proposed model includes the following: 
 
1. The requisite regulatory framework is to impose a general requirement that 
auditors be independent of the management of auditees and that auditor 
decision-making be independent of auditee management.   
2. The regulatory framework changes need not involve defining auditor 
independence in detail.  Nor should they describe or limit certain behaviour 
of audit firms in respect of real or perceived audit independence threats. 
3. The regulatory framework should be changed to require auditors entitled to 
undertake company audits to not only demonstrate adequate levels of 
competence, but also to have access to a recognised independence control 
process. 
4. The appropriate corporate regulator, suggested here to be the FRC, should be 
empowered to approve independence quality control processes for use by 
audit firms. 
5. Each audit firm should establish an audit independence quality control 
process. 
6. Audit firms should compete with each other in respect of their independence 
quality control processes, as they presently do in respect of price and 
competency. 
7. The quality control processes for independence should be observable by a 
wide section of the market and stakeholders in the market for audit services 
 
Audits require competence and independence.  There are a number of 
mechanisms that can be used to ensure each is present.  Competition has driven up 
competence but this mechanism is not observable in respect of independence.  The 
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models propose a market-based solution that will ensure competition on 
competence and independence as well as competition in respect of price.   
In addition to focusing on competing over independence our model suggests 
that — to ensure a fully informed market — communication, market transparency 
and accountability are needed.   
It can be argued that the efficient and effective operation of this market needs 
the provision of a carefully constructed regulatory framework.  The recommended 
model would benefit from a regulatory framework that oversees strong 
competitive processes to enhance the quality and transparency of independence 
decision-making in audit firms, and greater disclosure of auditors’ skills and 
attributes to enhance auditor accountability.   
Against this proposal lies the prospect that the market is not sufficiently 
mature or sophisticated to evaluate auditor independence, even when information 
on the within-firm processes is transparent.  There is also the possibility that being 
‘in-house’ it will be viewed with scepticism by stakeholders who have lost faith in 
the profession to alone deliver meaningful reform in this area.  Additionally, the 
advent of independence quality processes across suppliers of audit services 
challenges current commercial imperatives, and will require a shift in culture 
within the firms that may be too difficult for the firms to make, even given the 
impetus of recent concerns over the efficacy of audit.  Many will argue that market 
failure has been demonstrated too often in this area and that depending on a 
market-based mechanism, particularly when it emerged voluntarily only after a 
severe shock, to provide a solution to such an important issue is fraught with 
danger.  However, the inefficiency and economic dysfunction that often 
accompanies imposed regulation also needs to be considered in evaluating the 
model proposed in this paper. 
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